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Abstract
We investigate the effects of technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition
on the performance of U.S. banks.  Our most striking result is that during 1991-1997, cost productivity worsened
while profit productivity improved substantially, particularly for banks engaging in mergers.  The data are
consistent with the hypothesis that  banks tried to maximize profits by raising revenues as well as reducing costs.
Banks appeared to provide additional or higher quality services that raised costs but also raised revenues by more
than the cost increases.  The results suggest that methods that exclude revenues when assessing performance may
be misleading.
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1.  Introduction
Much of the attention regarding the recent boom in the U.S. economy has centered on improvements in
productivity associated with technological progress in information processing, telecommunications, and other
technologies.  Performance gains in the financial industry have also been linked to improvements in financial
technologies, including new tools of financial engineering, and the more advanced use of statistical techniques.  This
raises the obvious question: how have these developments affected the performance of banks?
To address this broad question, we begin by noting that the banking industry may have benefitted
considerably from advances in both nonfinancial and financial technologies.  On the one hand, due to consolidation
and deregulation, banking has become more competitive, and one would expect that many inefficiencies have been
rooted out.  Banks have used information processing to process deposit and loan customer information and to evaluate
risks more efficiently, and telecommunications technologies to transmit this information and to process payments
more quickly with fewer resources.  This might suggest an improvement in cost productivity during the 1990s.  On
the other hand, banks have also adopted new financial technologies and new services, and improved the quality of
some of the existing services.  These additional services or higher service quality may have raised costs.  So it may
not be obvious how measured cost productivity has been affected.  Similarly, it is difficult to judge a priori how profit
productivity—which incorporates revenues as well as costs—would be affected, since this depends in part on how
much more bank customers have been willing to pay for the innovations introduced by banks.
Our purpose in this paper is to examine empirically the two questions suggested by the above discussion.
First, during the 1990s, has the cost productivity of the U.S. banking industry improved or worsened?  Second, during
the same time period, has the profit productivity of the U.S. banking industry improved or worsened?
A striking finding of this study is that during the recent 1991-1997 period, cost productivity significantly
worsened.  The predicted cost of producing a given level of output actually increased, controlling for business
conditions in the local market (which include market interest rates).  Another striking result in our study is that profit
productivity improved dramatically over the same 1991-1997 period.  Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that banks provided additional services or higher service quality, which may have raised costs but also raised revenues
by more than the cost increases. 
Why are these additional profits not competed away?  One potential explanation is that there was an increase2
in conventional market power in setting output prices, perhaps associated with greater market concentration after
consolidation of the industry.  However, some evidence presented below suggests that this is not likely the
case—local market concentration changed little on average over time, and the changes that did occur are associated
with price changes that contribute very little to profitability increases.  A more likely explanation is that the higher
profitability indicates an ongoing process of innovation.  Early adopters of an effective new technology temporarily
earn higher profits, but the abnormal returns are competed away as the technology is diffused throughout the industry.
When another promising new technology comes along, the process starts again.  An industry like banking that has
adopted a number of successful new technologies at different points in time can have supernormal profits on average
for a considerable period, although different firms may be innovating and earning the extra profits at different points
in time.
Our analysis of changes in banking industry performance uses some of the recently developed concepts and
techniques from the cross-section efficiency literature.  The three main sources of the changes in costs and profits over
time investigated are: (1) changes in managerial best practice in the industry, which includes technological change
and the extent to which the best-practice firms adopt it, (2) changes in cross-section inefficiency or dispersion from
this best-practice technology, and (3) changes in “business conditions,” or economic factors exogenous to the banks.
These first two components—changes in best practice and changes in inefficiency—together form the more traditional
notion of change in productivity.
We analyze the sources of change in performance over the period 1984-1997 using three different
optimization concepts—cost minimization, standard profit maximization, and alternative profit maximization.  These
concepts are based on economic optimization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than solely on the
use of technology, as are some government and research measures of productivity change.  To our knowledge, only
one research study has measured alternative profit performance/productivity change, no prior study has measured
standard profit change, and no prior study of changes in performance or productivity has applied more than one of
these concepts.  We use all three concepts to ensure a comprehensive look at the data.
We decompose productivity change into the changes in the industry’s best practice versus changes in
inefficiency.  The estimated best practice reflects the behavior of the best existing banks, but not any “true” efficient
point, which would reflect the available technology and optimal responses to market prices and other business
conditions.  Changes in both managerial best practice and industry efficiency may be driven by technological
progress, regulatory innovation, or other changes in competitive conditions.  Thus, even if we rule out technological3
regress, productivity may worsen over time because of changes in regulation or competitive conditions.  Past studies
often found negative productivity growth for U.S. banks, and as indicated above, we find negative cost productivity
change during the 1990s.
Section 2 gives background information on performance trends in U.S. banking.  Section 3 reviews prior
analysis of bank productivity change from both government statistics and research studies.  Section 4 lays out the
optimization concepts and how they are applied to decompose changes in performance.  Section 5 gives the design
of our empirical analysis.  Section 6 displays our main empirical results, and Section 7 examines a number of
alternative potential explanations of the empirical results.  Section 8 draws conclusions.
2.  Performance trends in U.S. banking
The mid-1980s to the early 1990s was a period of relatively poor performance of U.S. banks.  Banks began
to realize problems with commercial real estate loans and loans to less developed nations, leading to performance
problems and a “credit crunch” in the early 1990s.  From that time until the end of our sample period in 1997, the
U.S. banking industry enjoyed substantially improved performance.
Some of these performance trends are illustrated in Table I.  Profitability as measured by mean return on
equity rose by more than three-quarters from 6.49% at the beginning of our sample in 1984 to 11.49% by 1997.  An
alternative measure of profitability, mean return on gross total assets or return on GTA, rose by almost 2/3 from 68.8
basis points to 113.4 basis points.   The revenues/costs ratio also rose sharply, by over 3/4, from 16.3% in 1984 to
1
29.4% in 1997.  Nonperforming loans/total loans showed substantial improvement in the proportion of loans that
were nonperforming (past due at least 90 days or on nonaccrual basis), which fell by about half, from 5.18% of loans
in 1984 to 2.57% in 1997, consistent with macroeconomic improvements.
[Table I goes here]
Table I also shows that cost ratios declined dramatically over time.  Mean costs/equity and costs/GTA fell
by almost one-half and one-third, respectively, over the sample period.  However, our estimates, discussed below,
show that cost productivity, which takes into account the businesses conditions faced by the banks, actually worsened
over this period.  One of the reasons for this seeming contradiction is that the rates faced by banks to raise funds fell
dramatically over time—e.g., the average interest rate faced on core deposits dropped by about 2/3 (from 6.82%in
1984 to 2.31% in 1997).  Thus, bank cost ratios fell, but not as much as would be predicted by the changes in
business conditions faced, particularly the market interest rates faced.
Table I also shows that most of the changes in cost, profit, and loan performance ratios occurred after 1991.4
Based on these data and other factors, our main analysis focuses on explaining the changes in costs and profits over
the subintervals 1984-1991 and 1991-1997, as well as over the entire 1984-1997 interval.  For robustness, we also
segment the data into other subintervals, examine small and large banks separately, analyze whether mergers explain
the results, and assess the performance effects of industry entry and exit.
The last three columns in Table I investigate two trends that could potentially help explain part of the
improvement in profit performance over time.  The standard deviations of return on equity (ROE) and of return on
assets (ROA) over the past three, four, or five years (the longest for which annual return data on the bank is available)
are proxies for bank risk.  The local deposit market Herfindahl index of concentration (HERF) is a measure of the
potential for the exploitation of conventional market power.  We investigate below two alternative explanations of
the improvement in bank performance—an increase in risk-taking and an increase in conventional market power.
The raw data shown here do not provide much support for these explanations—the standard deviations of the earnings
ratios appear to have decreased over time, and the increase in local market concentration over time is quite small.
Finally, the first column of Table I shows that the industry has been consolidating rapidly, with the number
of banks declining by more than 1/3 in 13 years, mostly through merger activity.  Results below suggest that mergers
may have played an important role in the dramatic changes in bank performance—merging banks appear to have
increased costs per unit of output but made up for this by raising revenues even more.
3.  Prior analysis of bank performance change
3.1  Government productivity measures
Government agencies typically measure productivity by the ratio of an output index to an input index.  The
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) developed a labor productivity measure for the commercial banking industry
(SIC 602).  They measure physical banking output using a “number-of-transactions” approach based on demand
deposits (number of checks written and cleared, and number of electronic funds transfers), time deposits (weighted
index of number of deposits and withdrawals on regular savings accounts, club accounts, CDs, money market
accounts, and IRAs), ATM transactions, loans (indexes of new and existing real estate, consumer installment, and
commercial loans, and number of bank credit card transactions), and number of trust accounts, each weighted by the
proportion of employee hours used in the activity.  Employee labor hours are used as the denominator of the
productivity index, although the BLS also computes an output per employee measure.  The BLS index for banking
productivity per employee hour grew at an annualized rate of 3.09% over 1984-1997, which reflects rates of change
of 2.99% and 3.20% over 1984-1991 and 1991-1997, respectively.  These data indicate banking productivity rising5
at a slower pace than the rest of the corporate sector.
2
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also uses labor productivity to update its output measure for
banking.  The BEA benchmarks the gross product originating (GPO) in banking every five years.  For nonbenchmark
years, real output in the banking sector is estimated by extrapolating the nominal measure of output in a
benchmarking year using the rate of growth of the number of full-time equivalent employees, in effect assuming that
labor productivity remains constant for five years (see Yuskavage, 1996).  However, a method that estimates a
decomposition of the aggregate figures has been devised, and it shows a 0.8% annual change in real output per hour
over the 1989-1997 period for the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector, of which banking is a part (Corrado
and Slifman, 1999).
3.2  Research studies of productivity change
Several academic studies have measured productivity change.  We slightly reinterpret some of their results
using our own terminology.  The literature often calls shifts in the best-practice frontier “technological” change, but
we prefer to keep explicit the distinction between technology used by the best-practice banks and the theoretically
best technology available.
3
Berger and Humphrey (1992) used the thick frontier approach to compare bank cost efficiency and to study
shifts in best-practice costs between 1980, 1984, and 1988 using data for virtually all U.S. banks.  They found that
when the shifts were not adjusted for changes in business conditions, average costs increased for all but the very
largest efficient banks in the 1980-1984 interval, followed by decreases in average costs for all sizes in the 1984-1988
period.  The increase in costs in the earlier period may in part reflect the deregulation of deposit rates.  To the extent
that the industry performed more poorly because of an increase in competitiveness that raised deposit rates, this may
be a social good, because the benefits to depositors from higher rates may outweigh the higher costs to banks.  When
the shifts in the average cost frontiers were adjusted for changes in the business conditions, an increase in costs was
still found for the 1980-1984 period, but a decrease was no longer found for the 1984-1988 period.
Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (1993) used a panel data set of 683 banks with over $100 million in assets
from states that allowed branching and that were continuously in existence during 1977-1988 to estimate total factor
cost productivity growth for the best-practice banks.  They found an average annual growth rate of 2.28% to 0.16%,
depending on the estimation method used.  The poor productivity growth was attributed to higher costs of funding
because of high market rates, elimination of deposit rate ceilings, and increased competition from nonbank financial
intermediaries, which increased demand for funds, reduced the supply of deposits, and increased the convenience6
banks provided through more branches.  The increase in deposit rates, increase in nonbank competition, and better
convenience all made consumers better off, but because quality of service is difficult to account for in the estimation,
the higher quality showed up as a decrease in productivity.
Humphrey (1993) used the same data set to investigate the effect on costs from shifts in the cost function.
Measures were derived from a simple time trend, from a time-specific index, and from annual shifts in cross-section
cost functions.  All three methods yielded similar estimates, with shifts in the cost function implying cost increases
averaging 0.8% to 1.4% per year, and small banks (assets of $100 million-$200 million) experiencing larger increases
on average than large banks.  Again, much of the decline in cost productivity was attributed to deregulation of deposit
rates, which has an offsetting benefit to depositors.
Again using these data, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) estimated changes in predicted profits using the
alternative profit function over the 1977-1988 period and decomposed the changes that occurred after deregulation
(1984-1988) into internal bank-initiated adjustments to the new regulatory structure and external changes in banks’
business conditions.  They found that for banks with assets over $500 million, the rise in profits from the 1977-1981
period to the 1981-1984 period resulted from a shift in the profit function and changes in business conditions,
particularly deposit deregulation.  Only business conditions accounted for the rise in large banks’ profits from 1981-
1984 to 1985-1988.  For smaller banks (assets of  $100 million-$500 million), there was little increase in profits
between 1977-1981 and 1981-1984, and in the later period, their experience was similar to that of larger banks.  The
same patterns held after controlling for efficiency.
Stiroh (2000) used a panel data set of 661 top-tier bank holding companies continuously in existence during
1991-1997.  He used several different specifications of outputs and several different methods of measuring cost
productivity change and found small cost productivity improvements of between 0.05% and 0.47% annually.  One
of his specifications was similar to ours in terms of the output and input definitions, but he included many fewer
variables measuring business conditions in his cost function estimations than in our specification.  This is a significant
difference and is likely to explain much of the difference between his results and ours.  While we both find that total
costs rose over the 1991-1997 period, our decomposition of this cost change between that attributable to productivity
change and that attributable to a change in business conditions differs.  Stiroh found that cost productivity increased
thereby reducing costs, but changes in business conditions contributed to higher costs.  We find that cost productivity
decreased thereby raising costs, but changes in business conditions put downward pressures on costs.  The difference
is likely because Stiroh’s business conditions include only variable outputs, fixed netputs, and input prices.  In7
contrast, in addition to these, we control for a number of additional business conditions in the market, including state
income growth, market nonperforming loans, the extent of interstate branching, urban vs. rural market, market
concentration, and federal regulator.  Some of these conditions, like nonperforming loans and state income growth,
were generally improving over the period and likely improved bank performance in a number of ways, including
fewer costs expended dealing with problem loans.  To the extent that these improved conditions are exogenous to
the bank, we would not want to conclude that improved performance derived from these conditions is a productivity
improvement for the bank.  Rather, we would want to label this as an improvement in the exogenous business
conditions faced by the bank.  In contrast, Stiroh's methodology would label this as an improvement in bank
productivity.
Several research efforts used linear programming methods to measure changes in productivity.  These
methods are nonstochastic and do not allow for random error.  The productivity changes are based on quantities of
outputs and inputs without regard to prices, so there is no way to determine whether banks became more or less
productive in an economic sense or responded more or less appropriately to market price signals.
Devaney and Weber (2000) investigated whether the market structure of rural banking markets affected
productivity growth over 1990-1993.  They used linear programming to calculate the Malmquist productivity index,
which decomposes productivity changes into changes in efficiency, shifts in the production function, and changes
in the scale of operations.  They found positive productivity growth at rural banks over 1990-1993.  Shifts in the
production frontier were the driving force of this productivity growth.
Wheelock and Wilson (1999) also used linear programming and decomposed the change in productivity into
its change in efficiency and frontier shift components.  While banks on the frontier improved over the period 1984-
1993, productivity declined on average during this period because of reductions in efficiency.  Most banks,
particularly smaller banks (assets below $300 million), were not able to adapt quickly to changes in technology,
regulations, and competitive conditions and fell further away from the efficient frontier. 
Similarly, Alam (2001) applied linear programming to a balanced panel of 166 banks with greater than $500
million in assets and uninterrupted data from 1980 to 1989.  She found that productivity surged between 1983 and
1984, retreated over the next year, and grew again between 1985 and 1989.  The main source of the productivity
growth was a shift in the frontier rather than a change in efficiency.8
4.  The optimization concepts and the decomposition of cost and profit changes
4.1  Cost minimization
The cost minimization concept assumes that firms minimize variable costs subject to exogenously given
prices of variable inputs, quantities of variable outputs, quantities of fixed netputs (fixed inputs or outputs),
environmental factors, their own managerial inefficiency, and random error.  This concept is implemented using a
standard cost function that relates variable costs to these exogenously given conditions.  For simplicity, the
inefficiency and random error are assumed to be multiplicatively separable from the rest of the cost function, and all
of the variables (other than dummies) are measured in natural logs:
lnC  =  f (X ) + lnu  +  ln .( 1 ) CC C C
The variable lnC measures log of variable costs (including both operating and interest expenses); f () is the best- C
practice (log) cost function; X   (lnw, lny, lnz, lnv) is the set of logged exogenous “business conditions” that affect C
costs, specifically, variable input prices (lnw), variable output quantities (lny), fixed netput quantities (lnz), and
environmental variables (lnv).   The lnu  term denotes an inefficiency factor that is zero for best-practice firms and
4
C
raises costs for other firms.  The ln  term is a random error assumed to have zero mean each period. C
We represent the cost of the industry at time t by the predicted cost of a bank with average business
conditions, average inefficiency for the period, and a zero random error.  This gives exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu] ,  w h e r e Ct Ct Ct

X  gives the average values of the business condition regressors at time t and lnu  gives the average value of the
 
Ct Ct
inefficiency factor.  The total gross change in cost between period t and period t+k is measured by the ratio of the
predicted costs in the two periods:
TOTAL    {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu ]} / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu] } . ( 2 ) Ct,t+k Ct+k Ct+k Ct+k Ct Ct Ct
  
As this is a gross change, a number below 1 indicates falling costs, and a number above 1 indicates rising costs.  All
data are measured in 1994 dollars, so we are measuring real changes in costs.  For example, a finding of 1.05
indicates that real costs have increased by 5% between t and t+k.  To make the findings easier to follow, the tables
will report the annualized average rate of change over the interval, i.e., the kth root of the k-period rate of change
[e.g., (TOTAL ) ]. Ct,t+k
1/k
We decompose TOTAL  into the gross changes in best practice, inefficiency, and business conditions: C
TOTAL   =  {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]}       (Change in best practice) Ct,t+k Ct+k Ct Ct Ct
9
               {exp[lnu ] / exp[lnu] }         (Change in inefficiency)

Ct+k Ct
               {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]}      (Change in business conditions) Ct+k Ct+k Ct+k Ct

             BESTPR     INEFF     BUSCOND  . (3) Ct,t+k Ct,t+k Ct,t+k
Thus, the change in costs is decomposed into three multiplicative terms.  The change in best practice,
BESTPR , gives the change in costs due to changes in the best practice cost function f (), since it holds business C C
conditions and inefficiency constant.  Similarly, INEFF  and BUSCOND  give the contributions from changes CC
in inefficiency and business conditions only, respectively.  All three terms are measured as gross changes.
Cost productivity change is the product of the change in best practice and the change in inefficiency:
PROD     BESTPR     INEFF Ct,t+k Ct,t+k Ct,t+k
         =  {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]}    {exp[lnu ] / exp[lnu] } . ( 4 ) Ct+k Ct Ct Ct Ct+k Ct
  
Although change in best practice and the change in inefficiency are different concepts, it is informative to
combine them into a single measure of productivity change, since this concept has been used in prior research and
is reported in government statistics.  PROD  is also relatively easy to estimate, whereas dividing it into BESTPR C C
and INEFF  is likely to involve more estimation error. C
Cost productivity change, PROD , represents an improvement over the government statistics.  As discussed, C
the government measures use the change in a single output, such as a weighted sum of bank transactions, divided by
the quantity of a single input measure, employee labor hours.  PROD  is a superior indicator of productivity in our C
opinion because it controls for all of the output quantities as well as the input prices, fixed netput quantities, and
environmental conditions specified in the business conditions vector X .  It is important to control for these factors,

C
so that a change in costs that is not due to any decision or managerial skill of the bank is not attributed to a change
in productivity.
PROD  also includes all variable costs, including non-labor physical input costs, other noninterest expenses, C
and interest costs, rather than just employee labor hours, as in the government statistics.  Bank employee labor hours
may also be an inaccurate indicator of labor input because of a trend toward outsourcing some operations to holding
company affiliates and service bureaus, so that the change in output per employee hour may overstate the change in
output per total labor hour worked by employees and nonemployees.  As of 1997 (a benchmark year for the BEA),
labor compensation expenses accounted for only 32.0% of the BEA’s gross domestic product of depository10
institutions (BEA, December 2000).  This figure explicitly excludes the compensation and product of employees
working elsewhere in bank holding companies.   It has been shown that the ratio of the number of employees to costs
has declined dramatically over time (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), as bank holding companies have moved many
of their back-office operations outside the bank itself.  Thus, costs are incurred at the bank level and are measured
in other noninterest expenses component of costs in the Call Report, but this labor is not measured for the bank.
Failure to account either for the labor used elsewhere in the holding company but effectively working for the bank
or for the cost of this labor and capital could bias government productivity measures toward a spurious finding of
productivity improvement. Interest expenses on purchased funds also often represent physical inputs involved in
raising the funds at the institutions from which the funds were purchased, and so should be included in our opinion.
In addition, it is important to include interest expenses on deposits because banks often substitute between spending
additional real resources to provide service and paying higher rates on deposits.
4.2 Standard profit maximization
The two profit maximization concepts assume that firms maximize variable profits, again subject to
exogenous business conditions.  Standard and alternative profit maximization differ from one another only in terms
of the specification of business conditions.  In studying firm performance, profit maximization is superior to cost
minimization because it more completely describes the economic goals of managers and owners, who take revenues
into account as well as costs.  For example, a decision that raises both revenues and costs, but raises revenues by more
than it raises costs, will appropriately be counted as an improvement in performance under profit maximization, but
may be counted as a deterioration under cost minimization.   The nonparametric methods and government
5
productivity statistics also generally neglect the beneficial effects of revenue gains.
Standard profit maximization is implemented using a profit function that specifies output prices in the
business conditions vector in place of the output quantities specified in the cost function, but all other business
conditions remain the same.  Thus, firms are assumed to choose their outputs in response to relative output prices and
other factors in the maximization process.  The standard profit function is given by:
ln( + )  =  f (X ) + lnu  +  ln  ,( 5 )   
where  is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all interest and fee income earned on variable outputs
minus variable costs C, which is used in the cost function.  Because profits may be negative, the same scalar  is
added to every firm’s dependent variable in a given time period before logging, so that the log is taken of a positive11
number ( varies over time).  X   (lnw, lnp, lnz, lnv) is the same as X , except logged output prices lnp replace  C
logged output quantities lny.  Analogous to the case of the cost function, f () is the best-practice profit function, lnu 
is an inefficiency factor that is zero for best-practice firms and negative for other firms, reducing their profits below
the best-practice level, and ln  is a random error with a mean of zero each period. 
The decomposition of the change in profit over time is similar to the cost minimization case, but the formulas
differ slightly because of the nonlinearity introduced by .  The representative profit of a bank with average business
conditions, average inefficiency for the period, and a zero random error at time t is given by exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu] t t t

   , and the total gross change in profit between periods t and t+k is given by: t
TOTAL   =  {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]      } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]     }. (6) t,t+k t+k t+k t+k t+k t t tt
  
Here, a figure above 1 indicates an improvement in profits, so that a figure of 1.05 would indicate that profits have
increased or improved by 5% between t and t+k.  The components of TOTAL  are decomposed as: t,t+k
BESTPR   =  {exp [f (X )]     } / {exp [f (X )]    } t,t+k t+k tt + k t tt

INEFF  =   {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]      } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]     }  / t,t+k t+k t+k t+k t+k t t tt
  
   {exp[f (X )]     } / {exp[f (X )]   }  t+k t+k t+k t tt

BUSCOND  =  {exp [f (X )]     } / {exp [f (X )]     } . (7) t,t+k t+k t+k t+k t+k tt + k
 6
4.3  Alternative profit maximization
Alternative profit maximization has the same objective as the standard profit maximization concept, but
specifies the same set of business conditions as under cost minimization—the logged output quantities lny are
specified in the X vector, rather than logged output prices lnp.  The alternative profit function is given by:
ln( + )  =  f (X ) + lnu  +  ln .( 8 ) a Ca  a
The total gross change in alternative profit TOTAL  will be the same as the total gross change in standard profit a
TOTAL  (the gross change in average variable profits), but the decompositions into the various components will 
differ because of the use of the slightly different business conditions.
We do not believe that firms actually take their outputs as given and maximize profits, as the alternative profit
specification literally implies.  We would not use the alternative profit maximization concept if the assumptions
behind the cost minimization and standard profit maximization concepts held precisely.  Nonetheless, Berger and12
Mester (1997) identified four violations of these assumptions under which the alternative profit concept may provide
useful information in efficiency measurement, and we apply them here in terms of measuring
performance/productivity changes over time.
First, if there are substantial unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services over time, and customers
are willing to pay more for  higher quality, banks should receive higher revenues that compensate for their extra costs
of producing high quality.  The cost measures may treat an unmeasured improvement in quality over time as a
deterioration in performance, whereas alternative profit measures take into account the extra revenues that cover these
costs.  Second, the variable outputs may not be completely variable, as assumed by the standard profit concept.  If
there are increases over time in scale economies in banking, and banks cannot adjust their size quickly, then the
standard profit approach may find inefficiency increasing over time as banks fall further below efficient scale.  The
alternative profit approach may partially mitigate this problem by simply evaluating bank performance at their
existing output levels.  Third, banks may have some market power over the prices of their outputs, contrary to the
standard assumption of exogenous prices.  An increase in the exercise of market power that raises prices over time
may be measured as an exogenous improvement in business conditions when applying the standard profit concept,
but may be measured as an improvement in best practice when applying the alternative profit concept, neither of
which is precisely correct.  Fourth, if output prices are not accurately measured, as is generally the case in banking
research (including this study), the standard profit function may be inaccurately measured, resulting in inaccurate
measurement of BESTPR , INEFF , and BUSCOND .  The alternative profit function may provide an  
alternative measurement of the components of the change in profitability that does not depend on output prices to
check robustness.   Because one or more of the assumptions underlying the cost minimization and standard profit
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maximization concepts are likely to be violated by the data, and because we wish to be comprehensive, we apply all
three optimization concepts.
5.  Methodological design
Our data set is primarily drawn from the Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports).  For each year from
1984 through 1997, the data set includes annual information on virtually all U.S. commercial banks that operated in
the year, although we primarily focus on data from 1984, 1991, and 1997.  Because of industry consolidation, the
number of observations declines from 14,095 in 1984 to 11,623 in 1991 to 8,855 in 1997, as shown in Table I above.13
5.1.  Variables
Table II gives the definitions of the variables in the cost and profit functions, their sample means, and
standard deviations for 1984, 1991, and 1997.  Although the continuous variables are generally expressed in natural
logs in the cost and profit functions, we show means and standard deviations of the levels to be more informative.
In choosing which financial accounts to specify as outputs versus inputs, we use the “asset approach” or
“intermediation approach” (Sealey and Lindley 1977).  All liabilities (core deposits and purchased funds) and
financial equity capital provide funds and are treated as inputs, and all assets (loans and securities) use bank funds
and are treated as outputs.   Physical inputs (labor and premises) are specified as inputs that generate costs.
8
[Table II goes here]
For the input and output prices, we specify the market-average price faced, rather than the actual price paid
or received by the bank.  As described in the notes to Table II, only data from other firms in the bank’s local markets
are used to construct these market-average prices.  The market-average prices faced are more likely to be exogenous
to the bank than the prices actually paid or received by the bank.  A second advantage is that any mistakes the bank
makes in setting prices for its inputs or outputs given the market price conditions will be counted properly as
inefficiencies, rather than just high or low prices or good or bad business conditions.  For example, a bank that sets
its deposit rate well above those of its market competitors, all else equal, will be measured as inefficient given its
market-average deposit rate faced in the lnw vector.  Market-average prices are also likely to average out some of the
computational errors in measuring prices of individual banks.
The variable inputs for which prices lnw are specified are purchased funds, core deposits, and labor.  The
variable outputs lny are consumer loans, business loans, real estate loans, and securities, the latter category being
measured simply as gross total assets less loans and physical capital, so that all financial assets are included.  We
specify off-balance-sheet items, physical capital, and financial equity capital as fixed netputs lnz.  For the off-balance-
sheet items, we use the Basel Accord risk weights on the assumption that the output may be roughly proportional to
the perceived credit risk on which these weights are based.  We specify these items as fixed primarily because of the
difficulty of obtaining accurate price information.  We also treat physical capital (premises and equipment) as a fixed
input because it is slow to adjust and because it is difficult to measure prices for these durable inputs.  Financial
equity capital is an input under the asset approach, which we treat as fixed, in part because it is difficult to change
quickly and in part because its price (the risk-adjusted expected return on equity) is difficult to measure.  In addition,
banks must meet regulatory capital requirements that may not be consistent with cost minimization or profit14
maximization.  It is important to include equity because it directly affects other costs and is an alternative source of
funding for bank assets.  It may affect the risk premium a bank pays for purchased funds, since equity provides a
cushion against insolvency and an incentive to control risks (Hughes and Mester, 1998).
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Among the environmental variables lnv we include the log of the market-average nonperforming loans to
total loans ratio, lnMNPL, and ½(lnMNPL) , since dealing with exogenous loan problems raises costs and lowers
2
profitability.  We use the market average rather than the individual bank’s ratio, since the market average captures
the exogenous conditions in markets that affect loan performance.  Market conditions are also accounted for by state
income growth (STINC, ½STINC ).  We specify controls for the state geographic restrictions on bank competition,
2
including unit banking (UNITB), limited branching (LIMITB), with statewide branching as the base case; the degree
of in-state holding company expansion permitted (LIMTBHC); whether out-of-state holding company expansion is
prohibited (NOINTST); and the proportion of the U.S. banking assets held in states allowed to enter the bank’s own
state (ACCESS, ½ACCESS ).  We also include the Herfindahl index of local deposit market concentration (HERF);
2
whether the bank is located in a metropolitan area (INMSA); and the identity of a bank’s primary federal regulator
(FED, FDIC, with OCC as the base case).
5.2  Functional form
We use the Fourier-flexible functional form, a global approximation that includes a standard translog plus
Fourier trigonometric terms.  Our specification of the cost function is:
ln(C/w z ) =  +    ln(w/w ) + ½       ln(w/w ) ln(w/w )  +     ln(y /z ) 3 3 i = 1 i i3 i = 1j = 1 i j i3 j3 k = 1 k k 3
22 2 4
        + ½       ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) +    ln(z/z ) + ½       ln(z/z ) ln(z /z )  k=1 m=1 km k 3 m 3 r=1 r r 3 r=1 s=1 rs r 3 s 3
44 2 2 2
        +       ln(w/w ) ln(y /z ) +     	  ln(w/w ) ln(z/z ) +     
  ln(y /z ) ln(z/z ) i=1 k=1 ik i 3 k 3 i=1 r=1 ir i 3 r 3 k=1 r=1 kr k 3 r 3
24 22 42
        +   [  cos(q ) +   sin(q )] +     [  cos(q +q ) +   sin(q +q )] k = 1 k kk k k = 1 m = k k m k mk m k m
44 4
        +   [  c o s ( q+ q+ q)  +    s i n ( q+ q+ q) ]  +    
  lnv +  lnu +  ln  ,( 9 ) k=1 kkk k k k kkk k k k n=1 n n C C
41 4
which is estimated separately for each year, allowing all the parameters to vary.  The variables (y /z ), (z /z ), and k3 r  3
MNPL (one of the environmental variables lnv) have 1 added before logging for every firm to avoid taking the log
of zero.  The q  terms are rescaled values of the ln(y /z ), such that each of the q  is in the interval [0,2], where  kk 3 k
here refers to the number of radians (not profits).   The standard symmetry restrictions apply to the translog portion
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of the function (i.e.,   =  ,   =  ,   =  ).  We do not include factor share equations, which embody restrictions ij ji km mk rs sr
imposed by Shephard's Lemma or Hotelling’s Lemma, because these would impose the undesirable assumption of15
no allocative inefficiency (i.e., no errors in responding to relative prices).
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The standard and alternative profit functions use essentially the same specification as the cost function with
a few changes.  First, the dependent variable for the profit functions replaces ln(C/w z ) with ln[(/w z ) + 33 33
(/w z )  + 1], where (/w z )  indicates the absolute value of the minimum value of (/w z ) over all banks 33 33 33
min min
for the same year.  Thus,   (/w z )  + 1 is added to every firm's dependent variable so that the natural log is t3 3 t
min
taken of a positive number, since the minimum profits are typically negative.    For the alternative profit function,
12
this is the only change in specification (other than relabelling the composite error term as lnu +  ln ), since the a a
exogenous variables are identical to those for the cost function.  For the standard profit function, the translog terms
containing the variable output quantities, ln(y /z ), are replaced by the corresponding output prices, ln(p /w ), and the k3 k3
trigonometric terms containing the output quantities q  are dropped. k
As shown, the cost, profit, and price terms are normalized by the last input price, the price of labor w , in 3
order to impose linear homogeneity on the models.   We also normalize the cost, profit, output quantities, and fixed
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netput quantities by the last fixed netput, financial equity capital z .  Since the costs and profits of the largest firms 3
are many times larger than those of the smallest firms, large firms would have random errors with much larger
variances in the absence of the normalization, and division by equity should drastically reduce this heteroskedasticity.
This normalization may also help reduce a bias toward finding high standard profit efficiency for the largest banks,
since these banks may tend to have higher profits for a given set of prices, primarily because they were able to gain
size over a period of decades, a feat that small banks cannot achieve in the short run.  Division by equity may also
give the dependent variables more economic meaning—the profit dependent variables become essentially the bank’s
return on equity, or ROE (normalized by prices and with a constant added), a commonly accepted measure of how
well the bank is using its scarce financial capital.
5.3  Methods used to decompose the total changes in costs and profits
We decompose the total changes in costs and profits over time, TOTAL ,  TOTAL , and Ct,t+k t,t+k
TOTAL  in several steps.  First, we estimate simple average-practice cost and profit functions for each year that at,t+k
include all banks whether they use best-practice versus inefficient techniques.  The change in the average-practice
functions over time reflects both the change in best practice (i.e., the change in f()) and the change in inefficiency
(i.e., the change in lnu). We then use these average-practice functions to separate TOTAL into the productivity

change PROD and the change in business conditions BUSCOND components.
The changes in PROD , PROD , and PROD  are the gross changes from period t to t+k in costs Ct,t+k t,t+k at,t+k16
or profits from evaluating the average-practice function, holding business conditions constant at their period t levels.
To see this, we rearrange the terms for PROD  from Eq. (4) above to give: Ct,t+k
PROD    =  {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]}    {exp[lnu ] / exp[lnu] } Ct,t+k Ct+k Ct Ct Ct Ct+k Ct
  
         =  {exp [f (X )]  exp[lnu ]}  /  {exp [f (X )]  exp[lnu ]} . (10) Ct+k Ct Ct+k Ct Ct Ct
 
The numerator is the predicted cost from the average-practice cost function from period t+k applied to the business
conditions data from period t, and the denominator uses period t information for both the average-practice cost
function and business conditions data.  Put another way, cost productivity change  includes the changes in best
practice and inefficiency, both of which are incorporated in the average-practice cost function and holds business
conditions unchanged.  We simply use the estimated parameters of average-practice cost functions to evaluate the
numerator and denominator of (10).  We estimate the changes in costs or profits that are due to changes in business
conditions  as the changes in costs or profits that remain after accounting for the productivity changes (e.g.,
BUSCOND  is given by TOTAL  / PROD ). Ct,t+k Ct,t+k Ct,t+k
In general, the predicted costs or profits from the average-practice function evaluated at the average business
conditions for that year and a zero random error term will not precisely equal the average total cost or profit for the
industry because the transformations of the dependent variables to estimate the levels of costs or profits are nonlinear.
We correct for this by multiplying the predicted levels from every average-practice cost or profit function by a
constant, such that the predicted cost or profit at the mean value of business conditions for the year in which the
function was estimated equals the sample average cost or profit for that year.  In this way, our average-practice
functions correctly predict the TOTAL that they are being used to decompose, and the estimated PROD and
BUSCOND correctly multiply to TOTAL.
Finally, we decompose the productivity changes PROD into the change in best practice BESTPR and
change in inefficiency INEFF components.  There is no consensus as to the best way to estimate the best-practice
frontier.  We use a version of the thick frontier method to measure BESTPR (Berger and Humphrey, 1991).  For
each year, we divide up the banks based on their residuals from estimating the average-practice cost and profit
functions.  Banks with residuals in the “best” 25% in each of ten size categories (i.e., lowest cost residuals or highest
profit residuals for their size category) are assumed to be best practice for that year.  We then estimate the best-
practice cost and profit functions using OLS on  this most efficient quarter of banks.  These estimated thick frontiers
are treated as the best-practice functions f (), f (), and f ().   The BESTPR are measured as the changes in costs C  a
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or profits due to changes in f(), holding business conditions constant at period t values.  The changes in inefficiency
INEFF are estimated as the changes in productivity PROD that remain after accounting for the change in best
practice BESTPR (e.g., INEFF  is estimated as PROD  / BESTPR ).  Because of the uncertainty Ct,t+k Ct,t+k Ct,t+k
involved in the estimation of the thick frontier, the breakout of the change in productivity into its components should
be considered less accurate than the other decompositions.
6.  Main empirical results–Cost and profit changes for all U.S. banks, 1984-1997
The top panel of Table III reports the total changes in costs and profits (TOTAL), and the decompositions
of these total changes into their PROD, BUSCOND, BESTPR, INEFF components for all U.S. banks over
1984-1997, and over the two subintervals 1984-1991 and 1991-1997.
[Table III goes here]
The TOTAL  figures show that the cost of the average bank rose at an annual rate of 1.1% over the entire C
1984-1997 interval, falling at an annual rate of 0.3% over the first seven years from 1984 to 1991, and rising at an
annual rate of 2.7% over the subsequent six years from 1991 to 1997.  These trends differ from those of the cost ratios
shown in Table I above, which were scaled by equity or GTA.  Here, we include these scale factors in our cost
business conditions vector X .  Financial equity capital is explicitly included in X  as the third fixed netput (z ), and C C3
GTA is implicitly included in X  through the inclusion of its components, the asset output quantities plus the physical C
capital fixed netput ((  y ) + z ).  k=1 k 2
4
Using the average-practice cost function (estimated using all banks) to decompose the cost changes suggests
that cost productivity worsened over both subintervals (PROD  > 1), while the business conditions as a whole C
reduced costs over both subintervals (BUSCOND  < 1).  Moreover, these changes are accentuated and quite C
substantial in the 1991-1997 subinterval, with measured changes in productivity increasing costs at an annual rate
of 12.5% and measured changes in business conditions lowering costs at an annual rate of 8.7%.
The strong benefits of these changes in business conditions in lowering costs are not at all surprising.  As
shown in Table II, interest rates on purchased funds and core deposits declined substantially during both subintervals.
Given that interest expenses make up more than half of variable costs, it is expected that these declines in rates would
reduce costs substantially.  Somewhat offsetting these declines was the increase in the price of labor.  The market-
average price of labor, w , rose from $30.7 thousand in 1984 to $32.5 thousand in 1991 to $36.2 thousand in 1997. 3
Financial equity capital (z ) grew by 5.1% on an annualized basis from 1984 to 1991 and 12.3% from 1991 to 1997, 318
and GTA ((  y ) + z ) grew by 3.7% and 8.3% per annum over the two subintervals, which helps explain why the k=1 k 2
4
cost ratios shown in Table I declined.  As to the environmental variables, the decline in market nonperforming loans
likely reduced the costs of dealing with these loans significantly, but the effects of liberalizations of state geographic
restrictions on competition may either improve or worsen measured cost performance, as discussed further below.
More puzzling are the measured unfavorable shifts in cost productivity of 4.2% of costs annually over 1984-
1991 and 12.5% of costs annually over 1991-1997.  Using the best-practice cost function (i.e., using the “best” 25%
of banks in each of ten size classes) suggests that both best-practice costs and inefficiency worsened in both
subintervals and that an unfavorable shift in best practice explains most of the worsened productivity over the 1991-
1997 subinterval (9.3 percentage points of the 12.5 percentage points).  As noted, this breakout of the change in
productivity into its components should be considered less accurate than the other decompositions, because of the
uncertainty involved in the estimation of the thick frontier.  Nonetheless, robustness checks using the best 15% and
best 35% in each size class in place of the best 25% yielded qualitatively similar results.
These cost productivity/best practice deteriorations over time are in sharp contrast to the BLS annualized
labor productivity improvements of 2.99% over 1984-1991 and 3.20% over 1991-1997, although other research
studies of productivity change often found productivity deteriorations.  Unlike the government statistics, our cost
productivity measure controls for all of the output quantities, input prices, fixed netput quantities, and environmental
conditions specified in the business conditions vector X .  Our variable costs include noninterest expenses, which C
incorporate costs incurred elsewhere in the holding company in support of the bank.
Previous research cited the deregulation of deposit interest rates in the early 1980s and the resulting
disequilibrium as important factors in worsening cost performance, but these factors almost surely cannot explain our
worsening cost productivity/best-practice over 1991-1997, which is well after the deregulation of the rates.  There
may have been an increase in competition owing to liberalization of state geographic restrictions on competition or
to exogenous market developments, which may make productivity/best practice appear to worsen because of a
measurement problem in which the benefits to consumers are not taken into account in the cost function.  However,
it seems likely that these effects would be concentrated in the states that liberalized their rules the most and would
largely be captured in the business conditions variables.
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The profit figures in the top panel of Table III show a dramatically different picture from the cost figures.
The profit of the average bank rose at an annual rate of 7.9% over 1984-1997, and at annual rates of 4.3% and 12.2%
over 1984-1991 and 1991-1997, respectively.  The data suggest that the increase in profits is entirely due to19
improvements in profit productivity—measured business conditions actually lowered profits slightly.  The standard
and alternative profit results differ as to whether the improvement in productivity is due to both improvements in best
practice and better efficiency (standard profit result) or whether it is essentially all due to improvements in best
practice (alternative profit result).  Most important and striking, both profit approaches find substantial increases in
productivity during 1991-1997—annual increases of 13.7% and 16.5% for standard and alternative profit,
respectively—in sharp contrast to the cost productivity deterioration for this subinterval. 
7.  Potential explanations of the empirical results
7.1  Revenue-based productivity gains
This section tries to explain the striking finding that cost productivity worsened while profit productivity
improved substantially over the 1991-1997 period.  One  likely  explanation is revenue-based productivity gains.  The
cost approach and other approaches that do not consider revenues may not capture unmeasured changes in output
quality over time or the profit maximization goal of banks, which requires that effort be spent to raise revenues as
well as reduce costs.  Efforts to raise quality may be measured as deteriorations in cost performance because these
efforts raise expenditures, even if they increase revenues by more than the cost increases.  The nonparametric
concepts and the government statistics suffer from these weaknesses as well.  Use of the profit approaches may help
take into account unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services by including higher revenues paid for the
improved quality, and may help capture the profit maximization goal by including both the costs and revenues.
Over time, banks have offered wider varieties of financial services, such as mutual funds, derivatives, and
other products of financial engineering that help customers invest and manage risks.  In addition, banks have provided
additional convenience through more extensive branching and ATM networks, expanded availability of debit and
credit cards, and a proliferation of online services.  It seems likely that providing these new services and improving
service quality significantly increased costs, but banks presumably made the necessary expenditures to maximize
profits through higher prices or expanding or maintaining market shares.  Our cost and profit productivity results are
consistent with this hypothesis.
As noted above, the supernormal profits from adopting new technologies may persist over time in the industry
if there is a series of innovations, as appears to have occurred in the banking industry.  The early adopters of a
successful new nonfinancial and financial technology earn supernormal profits from higher prices or increased market
share, and others follow to avoid losing market share.  The supernormal profits are competed away as the innovations
become widely adopted.  However, as long as the innovation process is ongoing, and different new technologies are20
introduced at different points in time, innovating banks can keep earning high profits on different new or improved
products.  The early adopters of the series of new technologies may earn sufficient additional profits to raise the
industry average for a considerable period, although the early adopters of different technologies need not consistently
be the same banks.
As an example of how technology takes time to become adopted, consider small-business credit scoring, a
set of statistical tools used to quantify and price risks.  Prior to the mid-1990s, credit scoring was widely used in
consumer lending, but it was little used in small-business lending for lack of a large loan database to develop a
reliable model.  Since 1995, however, small-business credit scoring models have become available from outside
vendors that pool data from a number of banks (Mester, 1997).   Credit scoring has been shown to be successful in
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increasing the small business loan market shares for the banks that have adopted it.  Nonetheless, this technology is
still in the process of adoption.  As of January 1998, 37% of a sample of the largest banks in the U.S. still had not
adopted small-business credit scoring, and this technology is still not used by most small banks (Frame, Srinivasan,
and Woosley, 2001).
7.2  Selection of time intervals
We next consider the possibility that our findings may be driven by the way we have divided up the 1984-
1997 period into two subintervals.  To check for robustness, the bottom panel of Table III repeats the cost and profit
change analysis of the top panel except the data are segmented into three intervals, 1984-1989, 1989-1992, and 1992-
1997.  The year 1989 was a relatively poor one for U.S. bank performance, and the 1989-1992 subinterval generally
corresponds to what most consider to be the “credit crunch” period.
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The results shown in the bottom panel of Table III suggest that most of the main results are robust.  Again,
cost productivity worsens in the early and late time subintervals and again profit productivity improves over time,
with cost worsening more and profits improving more in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  However, the credit crunch
subinterval 1989-1992 does differ in that cost productivity and best practice improve, while profit productivity and
best practice improve much more than over any other subinterval.  These unusual findings are reversed when the
1992-1997 subinterval is included along with the 1989-1992 subinterval—the worsening of cost productivity and
best practice over 1992-1997 would more than overwhelm the improvements of 1989-1992.  Overall, these data
remain consistent with the hypothesis that banks’ goals over time were to maximize profits and that they provided
additional services that raised costs but raised revenues even more.  However, these data also suggest that the
increased costs from producing higher-quality services may be temporarily overwhelmed by extreme improvements21
in cost productivity.
7.3  Heterogeneity between small and large banks
Another potential candidate for explaining our results is the inclusion of both small and large banks in the
same analysis.  Small and large banks may provide different products that require use of different technologies.  For
example, a $1 billion loan issued by a large bank may be a different product requiring different monitoring and
screening techniques than 10,000 loans of $100,000 each that may be issued (in aggregate) by small banks, but the
balance sheet entries do not distinguish among these products.  Also, it is likely that small banks and large banks
adopt new technologies at different rates, and adapt to deregulation in different ways.  To some extent, the observed
effects thus far could reflect the shifting of banks into larger size classes over time, which may use different
techniques to produce different products having different cost and profit characteristics.
To investigate this, we repeat the analysis for the smallest and largest quarter of banks in terms of GTA in
each year, estimating separate cost and profit functions and using the average level of business conditions specific
to each subsample.  In 1997, the smallest quarter of banks ranges from about $1 million to about $33 million in assets
and the largest quarter ranges from about $134 million to about $278 billion (all in 1994 dollars).  The smallest
quarter are unambiguously small, but the large quarter encompasses some medium-sized banks because there are not
enough large banks alone to accommodate the number of parameters in the models.
The results, shown in Table IV, suggest that our main results and conclusions about cost versus profit
productivity are supported, but there are some interesting differences between small and large banks.   Cost
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productivity worsens over the 1984-1991 and 1991-1997 subintervals for both small and large banks, particularly
over the latter interval, supporting the earlier results.  Using the other breakout of the time periods, the earlier finding
of cost productivity improvement for the 1989-1992 credit crunch subinterval that is overwhelmed by cost
productivity deterioration in the 1992-1997 subinterval is replicated only for the large-bank subsample.  The earlier
finding of profit productivity improvements in all cases is replicated here for all time subintervals.    Overall, these
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data are again consistent with the hypothesis that banks attempted to maximize profits in part by providing additional
services that raise revenues more than they raise costs.
[Table IV goes here]22
7.4  Potential increase in risk-taking
Another potential explanation of our striking findings is that banks may have taken on additional risks during
the boom period of the mid-to-late 1990s by shifting assets from securities to loans, by shifting from safer to riskier
loans, by adding off-balance sheet risks, by becoming more highly levered, and so forth.  Over the long run, higher
risks may result in higher average portfolio returns (although not necessarily higher risk-adjusted returns), and these
returns may have been magnified by the unexpected strength of the macroeconomy during this period, which may
have provided “lucky” short-term rewards for the additional risk-taking.  That is, an unusually high proportion of
risky investments may have paid off and raised bank revenues as the strong U.S. economy allowed borrowers and
other counterparties to repay an unexpectedly high proportion of their obligations.  An increase in bank risk-taking
that is not captured in our business condition variables, X  and X , may be measured as a profit productivity increase, C 
even if there is no improvement in actual productivity.
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To evaluate this possibility, we first note that our business condition variables, X  and X , do have a number C 
of variables that are correlated with bank risk-taking, so we may have already controlled for much of any change in
risk-taking.  Both X  and X  include equity capital, off-balance activities, and market nonperforming loans to help C 
control for changes in bank leverage risk, off-balance sheet risk, and loan risk, respectively.  In addition, X  includes C
the quantities of various types of loans and securities to help control for asset shifts and X  includes the market prices 
of these assets to help control for the portfolio risks.
Banks might be taking increased risks in other ways not controlled for in our estimations.  Nonetheless,
virtually all raw-data indicators suggest that risk has not increased.  The standard deviation of ROE fell from 0.0780
in 1991 to 0.0363 in 1997, and the standard deviation of ROA fell from 0.00501 to 0.00328 over the same period
(Table I).  Bank failures (not shown) also dropped precipitously from over 100 per year in the late 1980s and early
1990s to the single digits over the last few years of the sample.  Under normal circumstances, these findings might
suggest a decrease in risk, rather than an increase, although the unexpected strength of the macroeconomy makes it
difficult to rule out entirely that such an increase in risk-taking occurred.
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7.5  Possible increase in conventional market power
Another possible explanation of the findings is that there was an increase in conventional market power over
the 1991-1997 time period, in which product quality remained relatively constant, but banks exercised more market
power in setting output prices.  This could occur because of the consolidation of the banking industry over this time
period.  The increase in revenues from the higher output prices could explain the improvement in profit performance.23
The worsened cost performance may also result in part from an increase in conventional market power, given that
it has been found that banks in more highly concentrated local markets have lower cost efficiency, all else equal,
presumably because of reduced managerial effort when competition is lax (Berger and Mester 1997, Berger and
Hannan, 1998).
However, there are reasons to suspect this does not explain much of our findings.  First, local market
concentration changed little on average over time.  The average value of HERF, the local deposit market
concentration faced by banks, rose only about 1.6% from 0.2324 in 1991 to 0.2361 in 1997 (Table I).  Despite the
merger wave in banking, most of the activity appears to have been of the market-extension type that joined institutions
in different local markets.   Second, some recent research also suggests that the banks with persistently high profits
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in the 1990s are not consistently those with high measured market power (Berger, et al., 2000).  In addition, both the
X  and X  vectors of business conditions control for HERF, market-average input prices faced, and state geographic C 
restrictions on bank competition, and the X  vector also controls for market-average output prices faced, although 
prices are imperfectly measured.  Thus, changes in market power would most likely be measured as the effects of
changes in business conditions, rather than changes in productivity.
To investigate the conventional market power issue further, we run some additional regressions to estimate
how changes in market concentration and other changes in competitive conditions in markets affected output prices.
As shown in Table V, we regress the prices of each of the four variable outputs–consumer loans, business loans, real
estate loans, and securities–on market concentration (HERF), the variables representing state geographic restrictions
on competition (UNITB, LIMITB, LIMTBHC, NOINTST, and ACCESS, with STATEB excluded as the base case),
and variables measuring the recent merger activity of the bank.  The merger variables are dummies for whether the
bank engaged in one or more mergers (i.e., absorbed one or more other bank charters) in the current year (MERGE0),
prior year (MERGE1), or two years prior (MERGE2).  These variables allow for the possibility that mergers result
in dynamic changes in competition beyond their effects on HERF and the expected effects of the state geographic
restrictions.  The models are estimated over 1984-1997 with 163,547 observations.  We then calculate the effects of
the estimated changes in output prices on variable profits.
[Table V goes here]
The results suggest very little effect of market power increases on our profit performance results.  The
coefficients on HERF indicate that greater concentration is positively and statistically significantly related to the
prices of business loans and securities, positively but insignificantly related to the price of real estate loans, and24
significantly negatively related to the price of consumer loans. The results also suggest that state geographic
restrictions on branching and holding company acquisitions within a state (UNITB, LIMITB, LIMTBHC) had mixed
effects on prices.  However, the prohibition on interstate banking activities (NOINTST) and the amount of interstate
access (ACCESS) have the consistent prediction that a larger potential for interstate competition is related to reduced
banking prices, as expected.  After controlling for concentration and state restrictions on competition, mergers tend
to be significantly negatively related to prices of business loans and securities, significantly positively related to the
price of consumer loans, and have a mixed, but overall positive relationship with the price of real estate loans.
Despite the finding that many of these effects are statistically significant, their estimated economic effects
on profits are quite small, and the explanatory power of the regressors as a whole is quite low.  To illustrate the
economic effects of HERF, we calculate the predicted effect of the increase in HERF between 1991 and 1997 on each
output price, and then calculate the effects of these changes in output prices on variable profits.  The annualized
predicted effect of the change in HERF on profits is only 0.021%, quite small compared with the annualized total
changes in profit of 12.2%, standard profit productivity of 13.7% and alternative profit productivity of 16.5% over
this same period shown in Table III above.
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The effects of the merger variables, MERGE0, MERGE1, and MERGE2, were computed similarly.  The
increase in merger activity between 1991 and 1997 had a negative annualized predicted effect on profits of 0.019%
after controlling for the other variables, which is again economically quite small.   We also re-estimated the price
24
regressions including variables for whether the bank was acquired by a new top-tier holding company but retained
its charter (not shown in Table V, but available from the authors).  The measured effects on profits of the mergers
and bank holding company purchases together were again negative and very small.   Thus, the data suggest that any
25
effect of increases in conventional market power from the consolidation of the banking industry are not likely to
explain much of our striking performance results.
7.6  Other dynamic effects associated with bank mergers
Mergers may be also associated with other dynamic changes in productivity and performance beyond the
exercise of conventional market power.  As examples, merging banks might be more aggressive than others in
adopting new technologies, they may bring innovations they have already adopted to the banks they acquire, or they
may gain a scale of operations needed to take full advantage of new technologies.
To investigate further whether merger activity may account for some of our findings, we re-estimate our cost
and profit functions for each year for a subsample of merging banks and nonmerging banks.  For a given year, the25
merging-banks subsample includes banks that engaged in mergers (i.e., absorbed one or more other bank charters)
in the current year or prior two years (MERGE0, MERGE1, or MERGE2 = 1), and the nonmerging-banks subsample
includes all other banks.  We evaluate the cost and profit functions at the average level of business conditions for that
subsample.
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The results shown in TableVI suggest that merging banks may be responsible for much of our main  findings
for the 1991-1997 subinterval.   For this subinterval, merging banks had substantial measured cost productivity
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deterioration of 15.2% annually and standard and alternative profit productivity improvements of 27.4% and 29.5%
annually, respectively.  These figures are larger in absolute value than the corresponding productivity changes for
the industry as a whole shown in Table III above.   The changes in average costs and profits for merging banks over
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this interval (TOTAL) are also larger than the industry figures.  Nonmerging banks also had productivity changes
in the same direction over this interval, but these changes were much smaller than those of merging banks and the
industry as a whole.  If our hypothesis that banks provided additional services or higher service quality that raised
costs but also raised revenues by a greater amount is correct, then the data in Table VI suggest that merging banks
may have done this more than other banks, perhaps as part of their overall strategies of refocusing their institutions.
[Table VI goes here]
Other explanations of the findings for the merging banks are also possible.  Merging banks may have
improved their profit performance by shifting their portfolios in ways to take advantage of diversification benefits
of the mergers.  This would be consistent with studies that found improved profit efficiency for merging banks linked
to the diversification of risks (e.g., Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997; Berger 1998) and with studies that found
greater profit performance for banks that are geographically diversified (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1996,
1999).  The literature suggests that improved risk diversification allows banks to shift their asset portfolios from
securities to loans and to have more assets and loans per dollar of equity, raising average revenues and profits.
However, the merger literature generally does not find worsened cost performance from mergers—typically mergers
were found to have little effect on bank costs or to improve them slightly (e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades,
1998).  Thus, the merger efficiency literature suggests why the change in profit productivity for merging banks may
be more favorable than the change in cost productivity, but it does by itself explain our observed cost productivity
deterioration for merging banks.  An additional possibility is that organizational problems/disruptions associated with
consolidation activity may be responsible for part of the cost productivity deterioration, but we are unaware of any
strong evidence to support this possibility.  Finally, increases in conventional market power may also help explain26
part of the measured profit productivity improvement from mergers, but the evidence given in subsection 7.5 suggests
that this is unlikely to explain much of the results.
7.7 Bank entry and exit
As a final check on our results, we also investigate whether our results were primarily due to banks that
entered and exited the industry.  For example, firms that remained in the industry may not have changed their
behavior significantly, but that firms that entered during the 1991-1997 time interval may have had relatively low cost
productivity and relatively high profit productivity, or that firms that exited may have had relatively high cost
productivity and relatively low profit productivity.  There is often significant entry into commercial banking through
new charters (de novo entry) or conversions from different types of charter (e.g., savings and loans), and exit through
failure or merger.  Recall from our definition above that merging banks do not enter or exit in the year of the merger,
but the banks whose charters they absorbed are counted as exiting.
We examine this issue by rerunning our estimations using a balanced panel of banks that remained in the
sample from 1984 through 1997, and the results are shown at the bottom of Table VI.  There are 7,392 banks in the
panel, or 52.4% of the 14,095 banks at the beginning of the time interval and 83.5% of the 8,855 banks at the end
of the interval.  The results for the balanced panel are very similar to those reported in Table III using the full sample.
This suggests that our results were primarily driven by banks that remained in the sample over time (including the
merging banks), rather than being driven by differences in productivity of banks that entered and exited over the time
interval.
8.  Conclusions
It seems likely that the banking industry would have had tremendous improvements in productivity in recent
years, although conventional measurement does not always show this expected result.  Banks have adopted
innovations in nonfinancial technologies such as information processing and telecommunications, as well as
innovations in financial technologies such as financial engineering and statistical analysis in evaluating risks.  In
addition, the U.S. banking industry has been substantially deregulated over the last two decades, with geographic and
product restrictions greatly relaxed, and the industry has undergone a significant consolidation as thousands of banks
have disappeared because of M&As and failures.  This paper examines how the performance of the banking industry
has been affected by these changes in technology, deregulation, and competition.  We measure three components of
the changes in performance—changes in managerial best practice, which includes technological change and the extent
to which the best-practice firms in the industry adopt it, changes in cross-section inefficiency, i.e., dispersion from27
this best-practice technology, and changes in business conditions exogenous to the banks.  We often focus on
productivity change, which combines the changes in best practice and changes in inefficiency.
We perform our analysis using three different optimization concepts—cost minimization, standard profit
maximization, and alternative profit maximization.  These concepts are based on economic optimization in reaction
to market prices and other business conditions, in contrast to some government and research measures of productivity
change.  In our opinion, profit maximization is superior to cost minimization for studying firm performance because
it more completely describes the economic goals of managers and owners, who take revenues into account as well
as costs.  Prior research and government productivity statistics have almost always neglected revenues, which may
have resulted in misleading findings.
Our most striking result is that during 1991-1997, cost productivity in the banking industry worsened while
profit productivity improved substantially.  The most likely explanation is that revenue-based productivity changes
are not accounted for in the cost minimization approach.  The data are consistent with the hypothesis that banks tried
to maximize profits by raising revenues as well as by reducing costs.  Over time, banks have offered wider varieties
of financial services and provided additional convenience.  These additional services or higher service quality, which
are difficult to control for in cost and profit functions, may have raised costs but also raised revenues by more than
the cost increases, resulting in measurement of worsened cost productivity, but improved profit productivity.  Banks
that adopt new technologies early are able to capture the return on these technologies in the form of higher profits.
As more and more banks adopt the technology, the returns are competed away.  The next innovation produces the
same result, with early adopters earning high profits until the innovation diffuses through the industry.  As long as
the innovation process is ongoing, and different new technologies are introduced at different points in time, the
innovating banks can keep earning high profits, although it is not necessarily the same individual banks that are the
innovators at different points in time.
Further analysis also suggests that banks involved in merger activity may be responsible for much of our main
findings.  Merging banks had greater cost productivity deterioration and profit productivity improvements than other
banks.  Any additional services or higher service quality that raised both costs and revenues on average in the industry
may have occurred most often for banks engaging in mergers.  Merging banks may also have improved their profit
performance on average by shifting their portfolios into investments with  higher risk and higher expected return to
take advantage of diversification gains from the mergers.  This diversification benefit may help explain why the
change in profit productivity for merging banks may be more favorable than the change in cost productivity, although28
it does not by itself explain our observed cost productivity deterioration.
Additional analyses in which the models were rerun for a number of different groupings and in a number of
different ways generally supported our findings.  Our main results were robust to different choices of the time
intervals, the use of separate small-bank and large-bank samples, the exclusion of banks that were not present for the
entire time interval, the inclusion of measures of the cost of equity capital, and the use of different “thicknesses” in
the thick frontier method for disentangling productivity change into its components.29
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TABLE I
Raw Data Measures of Profits, Cost, Risk, and Market Concentration
Unweighted Means for the U.S. Banking Industry, 1984-1997
Year Number Return Return Costs/ Costs/ Revenues/ Nonperforming Std. Std. HERF
of on on GTA Equity GTA Costs Loans/Total Dev. of Dev. of
Banks Equity Loans ROE ROA
1984 14,095 0.0649 0.00688 1.248 0.0959 1.163 0.0518 NA NA 0.2248
1985 14,027 0.0430 0.00570 1.195 0.0904 1.175 0.0576 NA NA 0.2234
1986 13,734 0.0111 0.00424 1.153 0.0827 1.166 0.0549 0.0949 0.00544 0.2235
1987 13,237 0.0198 0.00480 1.085 0.0784 1.178 0.0473 0.1009 0.00585 0.2258
1988 12,639 0.0507 0.00649 1.083 0.0794 1.182 0.0415 0.0963 0.00584 0.2321
1989 12,295 0.0705 0.00756 1.131 0.0851 1.181 0.0409 0.0943 0.00584 0.2333
1990 11,968 0.0568 0.00656 1.130 0.0844 1.172 0.0421 0.0903 0.00550 0.2332
1991 11,623 0.0714 0.00715 1.037 0.0802 1.183 0.0409 0.0780 0.00501 0.2324
1992 11,238 0.1049 0.00993 0.832 0.0693 1.257 0.0334 0.0690 0.00474 0.2348
1993 10,785 0.1160 0.01101 0.698 0.0608 1.290 0.0285 0.0621 0.00469 0.2376
1994 10,289 0.1142 0.01072 0.699 0.0606 1.298 0.0251 0.0552 0.00434 0.2363
1995 9,747 0.1135 0.01096 0.700 0.0646 1.285 0.0265 0.0467 0.00391 0.2342
1996 9,303 0.1151 0.01107 0.696 0.0644 1.296 0.0275 0.0389 0.00341 0.2369
1997 8,855 0.1149 0.01134 0.685 0.0659 1.294 0.0257 0.0363 0.00328 0.2361
Source: Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports).  The Call Report definitions given below pertain to the 1997 report for
banks with domestic and foreign offices (Form FFIEC 031).  Comparable definitions were used for other banks and other years.
Notes: GTA refers to gross total assets, which equals total assets (RCFD2170) plus loan and lease loss reserves (RCFD3123) and
allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans) (RCFD3128).  
Return on equity is net income/total equity capital (= RIAD4340/RCFD3210).
Return on assets is net income/GTA (=RIAD4340/GTA).
Costs are total operating expenses = interest expenses + noninterest expenses (=RIAD4073+RIAD4093).
Revenues are operating income (= RIAD4000).
Nonperforming loans are loans that are past due at least 90 days or are on nonaccrual basis = total loans and lease financing
receivables past due 30-89 days and still accruing, past due 90 days or more and still accruing, nonaccruing
(= RCFD1406+RCFD1407+RCFD1403). 
Std. Dev. of ROE is the standard deviation of ROE over the past five, four, or three years (the longest for which data are
available) of the bank’s annual return on equity; similarly for Std. Dev. of ROA.
HERF is the weighted-average Herfindahl index of local deposit market concentration across the bank’s markets, where each
weight is the bank’s deposit share in the market.  Let d  = bank j’s deposits in market k, then HERF for bank j  =  
jk32
TABLE II
Variables Used in the Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit Functions
Means and Standard Deviations for 1984, 1991, and 1997
All financial variables measured in 1000's of constant 1994 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
Prices of financial assets and liabilities are measured as interest rates.
Flow data are for the entire year, stock data are end-of-year values.
See the data appendix for Call Report definitions of variables.
1984 1991 1997
14,095 obs. 11,623 obs. 8,855 obs.
Symbol Definition Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Dependent Variables
C Variable operating plus interest costs, includes costs of 19,191 18,786 22,030
purchased funds, core deposits, and labor. (244,441) (217,483) (280,864)
 Variable profits, includes revenues from loans (minus 3,606 4,852 9,662
provisions for loan and lease losses and allocated transfer (33,750) (32,776) (99,310)
risk) and revenues from cash and securities, less variable
costs.
Variable Input Prices
w1 Market-average price of purchased funds (time deposits over 0.0757 0.0549 0.0432
$100,000, foreign deposits, federal funds purchased, demand (0.0156) (0.00987) (0.0051)
notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, trading liabilities, other
borrowed money, mortgage indebtedness and obligations
under capitalized leases, and subordinated notes and
debentures).
w2 Market-average price of core deposits (domestic transactions 0.0682 0.0428 0.0231
accounts, time deposits under $100,000, and savings (0.0152) (0.00822) (0.00666)
deposits).
w3 Market-average price of labor (1000's of constant dollars per 30.7 32.5 36.2
employee). (4.81) (6.06) (7.26)
Variable Output Quantities (Cost and Alternative Profit Functions Only)
y1 Consumer loans (loans to individuals, bank’s domestic 24,885 33,368 52,145
offices). (189,396) (264,761) (498,282)
y2 Business loans (all loans other than consumer and real estate 86,230 78,779 125,006
loans). (1,392,296) (1,178,579) (2,151,207)
y3 Real estate loans (bank’s domestic offices). 35,982 74,238 120,986
(321,058) (594,825) (1,105,862)
y4 Securities (all non-loan financial assets, i.e., 94,025 125,231 205,975
GTA  (y  + y  + y )  z , where GTA includes all financial (950,646) (1,109,465) (3,154,739) 123 2
and physical assets (without adjustment for loan and lease loss
reserves and allocated transfer risk reserve)).TABLE II, CON’T.
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1984 1991 1997
14,095 obs. 11,623 obs. 8,855 obs.
Symbol Definition Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Variable Output Prices (Standard Profit Function Only)
p1 Market-average price of consumer loans. 0.110 0.104 0.0963
(0.0306) (0.0242) (0.0274)
p2 Market-average price of business loans. 0.147 0.115 0.0974
(0.0428) (0.0373) (0.0282)
p3 Market-average price of real estate loans. 0.0990 0.0858 0.0793
(0.0172) (0.0142) (0.00967)
p4 Market-average price of securities. 0.0755 0.0612 0.0447
(0.0112) (0.00945) (0.00763)
Fixed Netput Quantities
z1 Off-balance-sheet items (commitments, letters of credit, 23,914 36,018 74,526
derivatives, etc.) measured using Basel Accord conversion (529,934) (787,436) (1,601,009)
factors and risk weights to be risk-equivalent to loans.
z2 Physical capital (premises and other fixed assets). 3,692 4,732 6,785
(34,467) (47,425) (75,692)
z3 Financial equity capital. 14,754 20,883 41,870
(132,792) (147,961) (445,268)
Environmental Variables
MNPL Market-average of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 0.0509 0.0406 0.0235
days or on nonaccrual basis) divided by total loans. (0.0226) (0.0190) (0.00982)
STINC Real state income growth (decimal) in bank’s state. 0.0567 0.0103 0.0294
(0.0197) (0.0134) (0.0105)
UNITB Dummy, equals one for banks in unit banking states. 0.273 0.0 0.0
(0.446) (0.0) (0.0)
LIMITB Dummy, equals one for banks in limited branching states.  0.648 0.418 0.322
(0.477) (0.493) (0.467)
STATEB Dummy, equals one for banks in statewide branching states.  0.0785 0.582 0.678
Excluded from the regressions as the base case. (0.269) (0.493) (0.467)
LIMTBHC Dummy, equals one for banks in states with limits on 0.621 0.477 0.489
expansions of multibank holding companies.  As of 1990, all (0.485) (0.499) (0.500)
states permitted some multibank holding company activity, so
the excluded case is states that allow statewide holding
company powers.
NOINTST Dummy, equals one for states that do not allow interstate 0.967 0.0583 0.000678
expansions of multibank holding companies. (0.178) (0.234) (0.0260)
ACCESS Proportion of nation’s banking assets in states that are 0.0350 0.505 0.607
allowed to enter the state in which bank is located (equals (0.0342) (0.312) (0.314)
proportion of national assets in the state for states that do not
allow interstate banking).jM  
m
i1,ij














14,095 obs. 11,623 obs. 8,855 obs.
Symbol Definition Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
HERF Weighted-average Herfindahl index of local deposit market 0.2248 0.2324 0.2361
concentration across the bank’s markets, where each weight is (0.167) (0.158) (0.146)
the bank’s deposit share in the market.  (See footnote to
Table I.)
INMSA Dummy, equals one if the bank is in a Metropolitan Statistical 0.449 0.436 0.432
Area. (0.497) (0.496) (0.495)
FED Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is 0.0725 0.0822 0.111
the Federal Reserve. (0.259) (0.275) (0.314)
FDIC Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is 0.593 0.599 0.606
the FDIC. (0.491) (0.490) (0.489)
OCC Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is 0.335 0.319 0.283
the OCC.  Excluded from the regressions as the base case. (0.472) (0.466) (0.450)
Notes: All stock values are real quantities (in 1994 dollars) as of the December Call Reports.  All prices are market averages of flows over
the year divided by these stocks.  Note that the flow used in constructing w  is interest expenditures less service charges on core 2
deposits.  The flows used in computing loan prices p , p , and p , are interest income on loans in the category.  Since provisions are 12 3
reported in the Call Report for total loans and not by loan category, we did not adjust income for loan loss provisions when
calculating output prices.  We did subtract provisions from loan income in calculating variable profit.
A bank’s markets are the MSAs and non-MSA counties in which it operates.  The market-average price is the weighted average of
the prices of the other banks in the market excluding the bank’s own price, where the weights are each other bank’s share of the
total input usage or total output production of all the other banks in the market.  A bank’s price is then the weighted average of the
prices it faces in each of its markets, where the weight is the bank’s share of its deposits in that market.
For example, for an input price, we define the price that bank j faces in market M as where m is
the number of banks operating in market M, x is the input use of bank i and  is bank i’s input price (which is bank i’s
ii
expenditures on the input divided by x).  Bank j’s input price is then the weighted average of the prices faced in each of its
i
markets, where the weight is bank j’s share of its deposits in that market: i.e.,   where N is the total
number of markets in which bank j operates and d  is bank j’s level of deposits in market k.
kj
We substitute the state-average price if the bank’s deposit share in the market is over 90%.  For the price of purchased funds or
core deposits, we also use the state-average price if the calculated market price is more than 10 percentage points over the one-year
Treasury bill rate or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  For output prices, we also use the state average if the calculated
market price is more than 25 percentage points above or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  We also eliminated
observations in which equity was below 1% of gross total assets because the data for such banks are suspicious.  All of the
continuous variables that can take on the value 0 have 1 added before taking logs in specifying the cost and profit regressions.  This
applies to the y's, z's, and MNPL.  For , an additional adjustment was made because profits can take on negative values (see the
text).35
TABLE III
Measured Gross Changes in Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit at U.S. Banks:
Total Change, Productivity Change, Business Conditions Change,
Best-Practice Frontier Change, and Inefficiency Change
All Banks
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in the sample in 1984 = 14,095, in 1991 = 11,623, in 1997 = 8,855
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.011 1.090 0.927 1.052 1.036 1.079 1.091 0.989 1.057 1.032 1.079 1.112 0.970 1.093 1.017
1984-91 0.997 1.042 0.957 1.015 1.026 1.043 1.081 0.965 1.058 1.022 1.043 1.113 0.937 1.118 0.996
1991-97 1.027 1.125 0.913 1.093 1.030 1.122 1.137 0.987 1.054 1.078 1.122 1.165 0.963 1.168 0.998
1984-97, 1984-89, 1989-92, and 1992-97
No. of banks in the sample in 1984 = 14,095, in 1989 = 12,295, in 1992 = 11,238, in 1997 = 8,855
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.011 1.090 0.927 1.052 1.036 1.079 1.091 0.989 1.057 1.032 1.079 1.112 0.970 1.093 1.017
1984-89 1.032 1.084 0.953 1.028 1.054 0.994 1.023 0.972 0.964 1.061 0.994 1.035 0.961 1.048 0.987
1989-92 0.871 0.983 0.886 0.928 1.060 1.242 1.294 0.959 1.373 0.943 1.242 1.340 0.927 1.271 1.054
1992-97 1.082 1.133 0.955 1.184 0.956 1.075 1.088 0.988 0.989 1.101 1.075 1.103 0.975 1.153 0.957
Notes: Figures reported are annualized average rates of change over the interval, i.e., the kth roots of the k-period rates of change [e.g.,
(TOTAL ) ]. Ct,t+k
1/k
For the cost measures, a number greater than one indicates an adverse shift toward higher costs; a number less than one indicates a favorable
shift.
For the profit measures, a number greater than one indicates a favorable shift toward higher profits; a number less than one indicates an adverse
shift.
TOTAL  {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu ]} / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu ]}  for cost; Ct+k Ct+k Ct+k Ct Ct Ct
  
 {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -    } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -   }  for standard profit; t+k t+k t+k t+k t t tt
  
 {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -    } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -   }  for alternative profit. at+k Ct+k at+k t+k atC t a tt
  
PROD  BESTPR  INEFF for cost, standard profit, and alternative profit.
BESTPR  {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]}  for cost; Ct+k Ct Ct Ct

 {exp [f (X )]  -   } / {exp [f (X )]  -  }  for standard profit; t+k tt + k t tt

 {exp [f (X )]  -   } / {exp [f (X )]  -  }  for alternative profit. at+k Ct t+k atC t t

BUSCOND  {exp [f (X )] / exp [f (X )]} for cost; Ct+k Ct+k Ct+k Ct

 {exp [f (X )]  -   } / {exp [f (X )]  -   }  for standard profit; t+k t+k t+k t+k tt + k

 {exp [f (X )]  -   } / {exp [f (X )]  -   }  for alternative profit. at+k Ct+k t+k at+k Ct t+k

INEFF  {exp[lnu]  /  e x p [ lnu ]}  for cost;

Ct+k Ct
  {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -    } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -   }  / t+k t+k t+k t+k t t tt
  
                      {exp[f (X )]  -   } / {exp[f (X )] -  }   for standard profit; t+k t+k t+k t tt

  {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -    } / {exp[f (X )]    exp[lnu]   -   }  / at+k Ct+k at+k t+k atC t a tt
  
                      {exp[f (X )]  -   } / {exp[f (X )] -  }   for alternative profit. at+k Ct+k t+k atC t t
36
TABLE IV
Measured Changes in Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit at Small and Large U.S. Banks
Small Banks: In each year, the smallest quarter of banks in terms of GTA.
Size range in 1984 = $1 million to $24 million in assets
Size range in 1989 = $1 million to $26 million in assets
Size range in 1991 = $1 million to $28 million in assets
Size range in 1992 = $1 million to $29 million in assets
Size range in 1997 = $1 million to $33 million in assets
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 3,523, in 1991 = 2,905, in 1997 = 2,213
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR  INEFF TOTAL      PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 0.982 1.045 0.939 1.046 0.999 1.034 1.053 0.982 1.019 1.033 1.034 1.053 0.982 1.035 1.018
1984-91 0.979 1.006 0.974 0.973 1.033 1.039 1.106 0.939 1.053 1.051 1.039 1.126 0.922 1.078 1.045
1991-97 0.985 1.153 0.854 1.111 1.038 1.029 1.028 1.001 1.039 0.989 1.029 1.217 0.845 1.602 0.760
1984-97, 1984-89, 1989-92, and 1992-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 3,523, in 1989 = 3,073, in 1992 = 2,809, in 1997 = 2,213
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR  INEFF TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 0.982 1.045 0.939 1.046 0.999 1.034 1.053 0.982 1.019 1.033 1.034 1.053 0.982 1.035 1.018
1984-89 0.977 1.016 0.961 1.008 1.008 1.031 1.038 0.993 1.021 1.017 1.031 1.069 0.965 1.032 0.998
1989-92 0.939 1.038 0.904 0.751 1.382 1.105 1.130 0.978 1.143 0.988 1.105 1.300 0.850 1.352 0.978
1992-97 1.014 1.063 0.954 1.059 1.003 0.997 1.040 0.958 1.049 0.992 0.997 1.108 0.899 1.362 0.824
Large Banks: In each year, the largest quarter of banks in terms of GTA.
Size range in 1984 = $  98 million to $165 billion in assets
Size range in 1989 = $110 million to $191 billion in assets
Size range in 1991 = $113 million to $176 billion in assets
Size range in 1992 = $116 million to $174 billion in assets
Size range in 1997 = $134 million to $278 billion in assets
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 3,523, in 1991 = 2,905, in 1997 = 2,213
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.014 1.113 0.911 1.104 1.009 1.086 1.107 0.981 1.032 1.072 1.086 1.122 0.967 1.111 1.010
1984-91 0.999 1.051 0.951 1.064 0.987 1.045 1.062 0.985 1.065 0.997 1.045 1.117 0.936 1.085 1.029
1991-97 1.031 1.108 0.931 1.124 0.986 1.135 1.165 0.974 1.044 1.116 1.135 1.232 0.921 1.224 1.007
1984-97, 1984-89, 1989-92, and 1992-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 3,523, in 1989 = 3,073, in 1992 = 2,809, in 1997 = 2,213
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL      PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.014 1.113 0.911 1.104 1.009 1.086 1.107 0.981 1.032 1.072 1.086 1.122 0.967 1.111 1.010
1984-89 1.038 1.091 0.952 1.069 1.021 0.985 1.064 0.969 0.991 1.025 0.985 1.030 0.956 1.026 1.004
1989-92 0.867 0.946 0.916 0.784 1.207 1.281 1.319 0.971 1.277 1.033 1.281 1.323 0.968 1.226 1.080
1992-97 1.088 1.139 0.955 1.224 0.931 1.084 1.101 0.984 0.981 1.123 1.084 1.122 0.966 1.125 0.998
Notes: Figures reported are annualized average rates of change over the interval, i.e., the kth roots of the k-period rates of change [e.g.,
(TOTAL ) ]. Ct,t+k
1/k
See notes to Table III for definitions of the change variables.37
TABLE V
Regressions of Output Prices on Market Concentration,
State Geographic Restrictions on Competition, and Mergers
           D e p .  V a r . : pppp 1234
Consumer Loans Business Loans Real Estate Loans Securities
Intercept 0.1103** 0.1041*** 0.08651*** 0.05328***
(614.682) (380.515) (756.192) 689.686




UNITB 0.001539** 0.01473*** 0.001385*** 0.002588***
(6.129) (38.436) (8.648) 23.928
LIMITB 0.001103** 0.01058*** 0.001527*** 0.005674***
(7.853) (49.358) (17.038) 93.785
LIMTBHC 0.01104** 0.002828*** 0.000523*** 0.002390***
(86.172) (14.462) (6.397) 43.309
NOINTST 0.006655** 0.01005*** 0.005616*** 0.008882***
(37.251) (36.875) (49.285) 115.440
ACCESS 0.009372** 0.01183*** 0.007962*** 0.010540***
(39.113) (32.355) (52.095) 102.124








MERGE2 0.001675** 0.002266*** 0.000673** 0.000918***
(3.654) (3.237) (2.301) 4.647
Adj. R-squared 0.0827 0.0920 0.0654 0.3753
Columns report multivariate regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses.  Note that the STATEB dummy variable is
omitted as the base case from the multivariate regressions to avoid perfect collinearity.  
*      Significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
**    Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.38
TABLE VI
Measured Changes in Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit at Merging and Nonmerging U.S. Banks
and for a Balanced Panel of U.S. Banks 
Merging Banks
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 458, in 1991 = 602, in 1997 = 631
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.100 1.229 0.895 1.251 0.982 1.107 1.160 0.955 1.065 1.089 1.107 1.192 0.929 1.139 1.047
1984-91 1.077 1.127 0.956 1.099 1.025 1.019 1.024 0.995 1.109 0.923 1.019 1.112 0.916 1.102 1.009
1991-97 1.129 1.152 0.980 1.269 0.908 1.221 1.274 0.958 1.112 1.146 1.221 1.295 0.943 1.065 1.216
Nonmerging Banks
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in this subsample in 1984 = 13,637, in 1991 = 11,021, in 1997 = 8,224
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 0.962 1.032 0.932 0.976 1.058 1.026 1.034 0.992 1.041 0.993 1.026 1.053 0.974 0.917 1.148
1984-91 0.979 1.025 0.955 0.990 1.036 1.033 1.070 0.966 1.051 1.018 1.033 1.103 0.937 1.093 1.008
1991-97 0.943 1.029 0.916 1.001 1.029 1.017 1.029 0.988 1.028 1.001 1.017 1.050 0.968 1.113 0.943
Balanced Panel of Banks
1984-97, 1984-91, and 1991-97
No. of banks in this subsample in each year = 7,392
               Cost                Standard Profit                Alternative Profit
TOTAL     PROD    BUSCOND   BESTPR   INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR     INEFF TOTAL     PROD     BUSCOND   BESTPR    INEFF
1984-97 1.018 1.092 0.932 1.094 0.998 1.091 1.096 0.995 1.055 1.039 1.091 1.121 0.973 1.092 1.027
1984-91 0.990 1.032 0.959 1.035 0.997 1.047 1.098 0.953 1.043 1.053 1.047 1.121 0.934 1.118 1.002
1991-97 1.050 1.132 0.928 1.129 1.003 1.144 1.159 0.987 1.087 1.066 1.144 1.195 0.957 1.108 1.079
Notes: For a given year, the merging bank subsample includes banks that engaged in mergers and retained their original charters (i.e., absorbed
one or more other bank charters) in the current year or prior two years, and the nonmerging bank subsample includes all other banks that
were in the total sample used in our main results reported in Table III.  The balanced panel of banks includes those banks that remained in
the sample from 1984 through 1997.
Figures reported are annualized average rates of change over the interval, i.e., the kth roots of the k-period rates of change [e.g.,
(TOTAL ) ]. Ct,t+k
1/k
See notes to Table III for definitions of the change variables.39
DATA APPENDIX
Call Report Definitions of Variables Used in the Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit Functions
All financial variables measured in 1000's of constant 1994 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
Prices of financial assets and liabilities are measured as interest rates.
Flow data are for the entire year, stock data are end-of-year values.
Unless otherwise stated, the Call Report definitions pertain to the 1997 report
for banks with domestic and foreign offices (Form FFIEC 031).
Comparable definitions were used for other banks and for other years.
Symbol Definition Call Report Definition
Dependent Variables
C Variable operating plus interest costs, includes costs of [RIAD4174 + RIAD4172 + RIAD4180 + (RIAD4073 
purchased funds, core deposits, and labor.  RIAD4174  RIAD4509  RIAD4511  RIADA518
 RIAD4172  RIAD4180  RIAD4508)] 
+ [(RIAD4508  RIAD4080) + (RIAD4509 + 
RIAD4511 + RIADA518)]
+ (RIAD4135)
= (RIAD4073  RIAD4080) + (RIAD4135)
 Variable profits, includes revenues from loans (minus [(RIAD4107  RIAD4230  RIAD4243)
provisions for loan and lease losses and allocated transfer + (RIAD3521 + RIAD3196 + RIAD4079  RIAD4080)]




w1 Market-average price of purchased funds (time deposits over Bank’s price of purchased funds = expense of purchased
$100,000, foreign deposits, federal funds purchased, demand funds / stock of purchased funds 
notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, trading liabilities, other
borrowed money, mortgage indebtedness and obligations = [RIADA517 + RIAD4172 + RIAD4180 + (RIAD4073
under capitalized leases, and subordinated notes and  RIADA517  RIAD4509  RIAD4511  RIADA518
debentures).  RIAD4508  RIAD4172  RIAD4180)] / 
[RCON2604 + RCFN2200 + RCFD2800  (RCFD2170
+ RCFD3123 + RCFD3128)  (RCON2200 +
RCFN2200 + RCFD2800 + RCFD3210)]
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.
w2 Market-average price of core deposits (domestic transactions Banks’s price of core deposits = expense of core deposits
accounts, time deposits under $100,000, and savings / stock of core deposits
deposits).
= [(RIAD4508  RIAD4080) + (RIAD4509 +
RIAD4511 + RIADA518)] / 
[RCON2215 + (RCON2200  RCON2215  RCON6645
 RCON6646)]
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.DATA APPENDIX, CON’T.
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Symbol Definition Call Report Definition
w3 Market-average price of labor (1000's of constant dollars per Bank’s price of labor = salaries and employee benefits /
employee). number of employees
= RIAD4135 / RIAD4150
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.
Variable Output Quantities (Cost and Alternative Profit Functions Only)
y1 Consumer loans (loans to individuals, bank’s domestic RCON1975
offices).
y2 Business loans (all loans other than consumer and real estate RCFD2122 + RCFD2123  RCON1975  RCON1410
loans).
y3 Real estate loans (bank’s domestic offices). RCON1410
y4 Securities (all non-loan financial assets) RCFD2170 + RCFD3123 + RCFD3128
 RCFD2122  RCFD2145
Variable Output Prices (Standard Profit Function Only)
p1 Market-average price of consumer loans. Bank’s price of consumer loans = interest income on
consumer loans less provisions for loan and lease losses
and allocated transfer risk allocated to consumer loans /
stock of consumer loans
= [interest income on consumer loans  ((net charge-offs
on consumer loans/total net charge-offs)×(total
provisions))] / [stock of consumer loans]




Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.DATA APPENDIX, CON’T.
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Symbol Definition Call Report Definition
p2 Market-average price of business loans. Bank’s price of business loans = interest income on
business loans less provisions for loan and lease losses
and allocated transfer risk allocated to business loans /
stock of business loans
= [interest income on business loans  ((net charge-offs
on business loans/total net charge-offs)×(total
provisions))] / [stock of business loans]




= { [(RIAD4010 + RIAD4065)  (RIAD4054 +
RIAD4055)  RIAD4011]  
[[ (RIAD4635RIAD4656RIAD4657RIAD4651
RIAD4652)  (RIAD4605RIAD4666RIAD4667
RIAD4661RIAD4662)] / (RIAD4635RIAD4605)] 
× (RIAD4230+RIAD4243)] }/ y2
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.
p3 Market-average price of real estate loans. Bank’s price of real estate loans = interest income on real
estate loans less provisions for loan and lease losses and
allocated transfer risk allocated to real estate loans / stock
of real estate loans
= [interest income on real estate loans  ((net charge-offs
on real estate loans/total net charge-offs)×(total
provisions))] / [stock of real estate loans]




Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.
p4 Market-average price of securities. Bank’s price of securities = interest income on
securities / stock of securities
= [(RIAD4107  RIAD4010  RIAD4065) +
(RIAD3521 + RIAD3196 + (RIAD4079  RIAD4080))]
/ y4
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.jM  
m
i1,ij













Symbol Definition Call Report Definition
Fixed Netput Quantities
z1 Off-balance-sheet items (commitments, letters of credit, For 1995 (comparable definitions for other years):
derivatives, etc.) measured using Basel Accord conversion (RCFD3819  RCFD3820  RCFD3429 + RCFD3654 +
factors and risk weights to be risk-equivalent to loans. RCFD3430) 
+ 0.5 (RCFD3650 + RCFD3652)
+ 0.2 (RCFD3820 + RCFD3428 + RCFD3433)
+ 0.5 (RCFD3821  RCFD3822 + RCFD3833 
RCFD3834)
+ (0.2 × 0.5) (RCFD3822 + RCFD3824)
+ 0.2 (RCFD3411)
z2 Physical capital (premises and other fixed assets). RCFD2145
z3 Financial equity capital. RCFD3210
Environmental Variables
MNPL Market-average of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 RCFD1406 + RCFD1407 + RCFD1403
days or on nonaccrual basis) divided by total loans.
Market-average price calculated as explained in the
footnote below.
Notes: All stock values are real quantities (in 1994 dollars) as of the December Call Reports.  All prices are market averages of flows over
the year divided by these stocks.  Note that the flow used in constructing w  is interest expenditures less service charges on core 2
deposits.  The flows used in computing loan prices p , p , and p , are interest income on loans in the category.  Since provisions are 12 3
reported in the Call Report for total loans and not by loan category, we did not adjust income for loan loss provisions when
calculating output prices.  We did subtract provisions from loan income in calculating variable profit.
A bank’s markets are the MSAs and non-MSA counties in which it operates.  The market-average price is the weighted average of
the prices of the other banks in the market excluding the bank’s own price, where the weights are each other bank’s share of the
total input usage or total output production of all the other banks in the market.  A bank’s price is then the weighted average of the
prices it faces in each of its markets, where the weight is the bank’s share of its deposits in that market.
For example, for an input price, we define the price that bank j faces in market M as where m is
the number of banks operating in market M, x is the input use of bank i and  is bank i’s input price (which is bank i’s
ii
expenditures on the input divided by x).  Bank j’s input price is then the weighted average of the prices faced in each of its
i
markets, where the weight is bank j’s share of its deposits in that market: i.e.,   where N is the total
number of markets in which bank j operates and d  is bank j’s level of deposits in market k.
kj
We substitute the state-average price if the bank’s deposit share in the market is over 90%.  For the price of purchased funds or
core deposits, we also use the state-average price if the calculated market price is more than 10 percentage points over the one-year
Treasury bill rate or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  For output prices, we also use the state average if the calculated
market price is more than 25 percentage points above or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  We also eliminated
observations in which equity was below 1% of gross total assets because the data for such banks are suspicious.  All of the
continuous variables that can take on the value 0 have 1 added before taking logs in specifying the cost and profit regressions.  This
applies to the y's, z's, and MNPL.  For , an additional adjustment was made because profits can take on negative values (see the
text).43
      1.  Throughout this paper, we use gross total assets (GTA)—total assets plus loan and lease loss reserves and
allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans)—as a superior measure of bank size to total
assets alone, since GTA does not depend on the performance status of the assets.  These unweighted mean returns
are somewhat lower in recent years than the more often reported asset-weighted mean returns because large banks
have tended to have higher profitability than small banks in these years.  Performing the analysis on an unweighted
basis allows us to extract meaningful amounts of information from banks of all sizes, rather than having the
analysis dominated by the largest banks, which tend to show better performance than small banks.  For example,
mean return on equity rose from 10.6% in 1984 to 13.9% in 1997 at large banks, and from 2.1% to 9.0% at small
banks.  Nonperforming loans to total loans fell from 4.6% in 1984 to 2.2% in 1997 at large banks and from 5.4%
to 2.8% at small banks.
      2.  See Dean and Kunze (1992), Mohr (1992), and Kunze, Jablonski, and Sieling (1998) for more information
on government measures of productivity change in the service sectors and see Fixler and Zieschang (1997) and
Fixler and Hancock (1999) for proposed new methods.
      3.  We review only some of the literature; see also the literature review in Alam (2001).
      4.  In some cases, the environmental variables are zero-one dummy variables, such as indicator variables for
state branching restrictions, rather than being logged continuous variables.  In this discussion, we suppress the
time and bank subscripts, but it should be understood that all the variables may differ by time and by bank and
that the best-practice cost function f () may vary over time. C
      5.  Note that profit maximization will differ from value maximization to the extent that banks are not risk-
neutral; see Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (2000).
      6.  As the scalar  goes to zero, INEFF  simplifies to exp[lnu ] / exp[lnu ], analogous to the cost case.  t+k t

      7.  Consistent with prior research (Berger and Mester, 1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997), we find that the
alternative profit function fits the data better than the standard profit function.  For every year, 1984-1997, the
alternative profit function yielded a much higher adjusted R .  On average, the adjusted  R  was 40% for the
22
alternative function, and 22% for the standard function.
ENDNOTES44
      8.  Hughes and Mester (1993) provided an empirical test of the role of deposits in bank production.
      9.  For robustness checks, we tried incorporating estimates of the cost of equity into measured costs and
profits—we re-estimated the cost and profit functions using as the cost of equity the purchased funds rate times
the quantity of equity or twice this amount.  Our empirical results (not shown) were materially unchanged.
      10.  To reduce approximation problems near the endpoints, we cut 10% off each end of the [0,2] interval,
so that the q  span [0.1×2, 0.9×2].  The formula for q  is 0.2  ( µ ×a ) + (µ ×ln(y /z ), where [a ,b ] is the kk k k k k 3 ) k k
range of ln(y /z ) over the entire 14-year time interval, and µ   [(0.9×2)  (0.1×2)]/(b a) . k3 k k k
      11.  The Fourier-flexible form is a global approximation in which the cosine and sine terms can make the
approximating function closer to the true path of the data wherever it is most needed.  Prior applications found
that the Fourier-flexible form fit the data for U.S. banks better than the commonly specified local translog
approximation (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997).  Here, the trigonometric terms improved the fit of the alternative
profit model substantially (adjusted R  increased by 6 percentage points on average), but there was very little
2
change in fit for the cost function.  To keep the number of parameters under control, we limit the trigonometric
terms to just the terms containing outputs, including all the first- and second-order terms and the own third-order
terms in q , which gives a total of 36 trigonometric terms and 95 total net free parameters in the model. k
      12.  This is a slight change from the simplified specification of  in the prior section, which is necessitated
by the normalizations by w  and z  (discussed in the following paragraph).  Thus, the dependent variable will be 33
ln(1) = 0 for the firm with the lowest value of (/w z ) for that year. 33
      13.  The homogeneity restriction does not have to be imposed on the alternative profit function, but we impose
it to keep the functional forms equivalent.
      14.  Analogous to the average-practice case, corrections are made to the best-practice cost and profit functions
so that they predict average cost and profit correctly.
      15.  Increases in competitive pressure may alternatively improve performance by encouraging banks to cut
other costs.  However, this cannot explain the observed deteriorations in productivity and best-practice.
      16.  In March 1995, Fair, Isaac introduced its “Small Business Scoring Service (SBSS),” a scoring model
developed with RMA, a trade association of commercial lenders.  The model was built using a sample of more
than 5000 small-business loan applications over five years from 17 U.S. banks.45
      17.  Use of the December 31 Call Report data means that the 1989-1992 interval essentially covers the
calendar years 1990, 1991, and 1992, which are often used to represent the credit crunch period.
      18.  We caution that these results should be considered less reliable than those in Table III.  The small-bank
and large-bank subsamples use only one-quarter of the data for each year, and the thick-frontier subsamples on
which the BESTPR and INEFF effects are based each use only one-sixteenth of the data for each year.
      19.  The BESTPR and INEFF effects are in some cases unrealistic, presumably because of the very small
samples used to estimate these effects, so we do not put much faith in these figures.
      20.  In principle, luck could explain our results even if banks did not increase their risk-taking.  However, the
increase in revenues is so large that this seems unlikely.  It seems more plausible that an increase in risk coupled
with good luck could have led to a large increase in revenues.
      21.  One study examined whether risk increased during the recent boom period by identifying portfolio
characteristics associated with high risk (Berger, et al., 2000).  The results were mixed, with the only finding of
an increase in risk being an increase in off-balance sheet activities, which we control for in X  and X . C 
      22.  Local markets, defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas or non-MSA rural counties, are reasonable
market definitions for retail deposits and small business loans, since these products are competed for primarily
on a local basis.  These market definitions are also usually those used in antitrust analysis.
      23.  This predicted change was calculated by first multiplying the coefficient of HERF in each of the output
price regressions by the change in average HERF over 1991-1997 to get the predicted effect of the increase in
concentration on each output price; multiplying each of these predicted price changes by the 1997 level of the
corresponding output; and then summing and annualizing to obtain the predicted effect on profits.  The predicted
effects of the changes in HERF over 1984-1991 and 1984-1997 are 0.044%  and 0.029% of profits, respectively.
      24.  The annualized predicted effect on profits of the change in mergers between 1984 and 1991 is 0.016%,
and between 1984 and 1997 is 0.016%.
      25.  The annualized predicted effect on profits of the change in number of mergers and purchases between
1991 and 1997 is 0.018%, between 1984 and 1991 is 0.058%, and between 1984 and 1997 is 0.033%.
      26.  Merging banks tend to be larger, have higher average profits, and lower average costs than nonmerging
banks. On average, GTA was $1.1 billion in 1984, $1.6 billion in 1991, and $4.2 billion in 1997 for merging46
banks, and $212 million in 1984, $247 million in 1991, and $228 million in 1997 for nonmerging banks.  Return
on equity was 10.63% in 1984, 9.47% in 1991, and 12.99% in 1997 for merging banks, and 6.35% in 1984,
7.02% in 1991, and 11.37% in 1997 for nonmerging banks.  Costs/GTA was 9.40% in 1984, 7.82% in 1991, and
6.27% in 1997 for merging banks, and 9.60% in 1984, 8.03% in 1991, and 6.61% in 1997 for nonmerging banks.
      27.  The results for the merging banks subsample should be considered less reliable than those in Table III,
since the numbers of observations on merging banks (458 in 1984, 602 in 1991, and 631 in 1997) constitute only
small percentages of the total numbers of observations used in the full sample (3.2% of total observations in 1984,
5.2% in 1991, and 7.1% in 1997).  The number of mergers may appear to be quite small until it is remembered
that (1) a merger involves two or more banks and we retain only the survivors in our merger subsample; (2) our
merger subsample does not include acquisitions in which the bank keeps its charter but becomes part of a new
holding company; and (3) small banks were not the survivors of many mergers over our sample period—e.g., in
1997, less than 1% of our small-bank subsample is in the merger subsample, while over 21% of our large-bank
subsample is in the merger subsample.
      28.  In contrast, over the 1984-1991 interval, merging banks had more measured cost productivity deterioration
than the industry as a whole, but less measured improvement in profit productivity.